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 Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are an integration of computing and physical 
processes. Information flow is an inherent property of CPSs and is of particular interest at 
their cyber-physical boundaries. This thesis focuses on discovering information flow 
properties and proposes a process to model the information flow in CPSs. A Cooperating 
FACTS Power System serves as a tangible example to illustrate modeling information 
flow using the proposed process. The proposed process can be used to model the 
information flow security, help analyze current information flow security requirements, 
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 Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of computation with physical 
processes. Embedded computers and networks monitor and control the physical processes, 
usually with feedback loops, where physical processes affect computations and vice versa 
[18]. In the physical world, the events occur in real-time so discrete event clocks cannot 
be stopped to create a consistent state and concurrency is intrinsic. However, computing 
and networking technologies currently do not take those into consideration well. CPS 
applications include high confidence medical devices and systems, traffic control and 
safety, advanced automotive systems, process control, energy conservation, 
environmental control, avionics, instrumentation and critical infrastructure control 
systems (such as electric power, water resources, and communications systems). Besides 
inherited physical interactions and their concurrent computation nature, CPSs are usually 
network-centric systems [25]. 
 Various issues in the study of CPSs need to be addressed. This thesis focuses on 
the security aspect of the CPS. Among the various security issues dealing with 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, this thesis focuses on the confidentiality of 
CPSs, especially on information flow security. The physical nature of a CPS tends to 
expose information flow through actions at the cyber-physical boundary. 
 Many CPSs consist of similar elements. In the Cooperating FACTS Power 
System (CFPS), an intelligent controller communicates with other intelligent controllers 
and makes decisions via distributed decision making. In the CFPS, an intelligent 
controller sits on lines of an electric power system to balance the power flow of the entire 
power system. Throughout this thesis the CFPS is used as the example to identify and 
model the information flow in a CPS. The CFPS serves as a real world example to show 
the applicability of the proposed process. 
 The family of Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices are power 
electronic-based controllers that can rapidly inject or absorb active and reactive power, 
thereby affecting power flow across transmission lines; a FACTS device changes the 
amount of power owing on a particular power line. The use of FACTS devices in a power 
system can potentially overcome limitations of the present manually/mechanically 
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controlled transmission system [3]. A FACTS Device (depicted in Figure 1.1) consists of 
an embedded computer that depends on a low voltage control system for signal 
processing, which, in turn, depends on a low and a high voltage power conversion system 
for rapidly switching power into the power line. Each FACTS device controls one power 
line (ControlledLine) and multiple FACTS devices interact with each other via 
exchanging messages over a network (Communication). The net effect of the FACTS 
devices and the power grid is that each power line and FACTS device is affected by other 




Figure 1.1 A FACTS device 
 
 
 The Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) device is a type of FACTS device 
[3][28] that can modify active power flow on a power line. In this thesis, the FACTS 
devices refer to the UPFC devices. 
 FACTS devices are primarily used when a cascading failure occurs within a 
Power System; one or more lines are lost due to a downed line or overloaded line and the 
resulting redirected power flow stresses the network. Too much power may flow over 
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lines of inadequate capacity and one-by-one the lines overload and trip out until a large 
portion of the Power System has failed [3]. FACTS device coordination is required to 
prevent cascading failures [1][3]. The FACTS devices themselves communicate over an 
interconnected computing network to reach agreement on how power should be routed or 
re-routed in the presence of a contingency. These Cooperating FACTS Devices (CFD) 
working together in the electric power network form the CFPS [28]. The FACTS devices 
behave autonomously, but they depend on information received from their participation 
in the CFPS to determine their responses. The CFPS uses a distributed maxflow 
algorithm [1] to rebalance power flow, which is done in the Long Term Control (LTC), 
running on different processors that are located in different UPFC devices to compute the 
decision and manipulate the power network by sending the power settings to Dynamic 
Control. The Dynamic Control then sets the Power Electronics to enforce the local power 
flow to an expected value which redistributes power flow at a regional or wider level 
within the power network. The LTC and Dynamic Control both sit in the Embedded PC 
as a portion of a FACTS device (shown in Figure 1.1). Each FACTS device must 
continually monitor not only its own behavior in response to system operating changes, 
but the response of neighboring devices as well. 
 Distributed computing management is different from a traditional centralized 
power network management system; the CFD manipulates the whole CFPS in a 
decentralized way, so that new security issues emerge. In [28], a broad investigation into 
the operational and security challenges that the CFDs face has been discussed. A general 
security analysis of FACTS has been given in the report which includes vulnerability of 
CFD and some available good practices based on those used for SCADA systems. An 
agent-based security framework has been suggested, while multiple levels of FACTS 
devices security issues and the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the electric 
power grid have been briefly analyzed. However, no approach has been proposed nor any 
concrete example described in the confidentiality of CFPS. 
 The North American Electric Regulatory Corporation (NERC) provides a basis to 
define permanent cyber security standards [34]. These provide a cyber security 
framework to identify and assist with the protection of Critical Cyber Assets to ensure 
reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. Those requirements, stated in Standard 
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CIP-002-1 to CIP-009-1, address various security issues and require approaches to 
provide security in the Bulk Power System. 
 This thesis identifies the vulnerability of information flow in a CPS from 
analyzing the example system's execution sequence. After analyzing the potential 
information flow of the CPS, a process is proposed to model the information flow 
security to provide secure computing in the CPS. Finally, automatic checking tools are 






2.1 INFORMATION FLOW SECURITY 
 A security model is used to describe any formal statement of a system's 
confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements [23]. Using information flow, 
principals can infer properties of objects from observing system behavior [32]. This is a 
potential hazard in the cyber-physical world so it requires more attention. To be more 
specific, inferring confidential information from the observable information flow is a 
potential source of critical information leakage; the information flow of CFPS needs to be 
carefully analyzed. Various security models that analyze multi-level security system 
behavior from the access control or execution sequence perspective have been discussed 
for decades to address the information flow problems of a system in the defense 
community. However, most of the related publications [21] [22] [23] [24] [27] have not 
been directly applied to CPSs. One of the reasons security models are less popular 
outside the defense area is due to the complexity. Considering the significance of the 
confidential information in critical infrastructure, it is worth introducing these models to 
address the information flow in the security analysis of critical infrastructure. Figure 2.1 
shows a partial taxonomy of the security models discussed in [24]. Those models in grey 








 Before defining the security models that has been used throughout this thesis, 
Table 2.1 is a list of convention: 
 
 
Table 2.1 Convention used in formal description throughout this thesis 
Symbol Meaning 
Tr  System traces 
τ  A system trace 
x\  System purge all traces in the domain of x 
21 | EE  Parallel composition of event 1E  and 2E  
H High-level security domain 





 2.1.1 Noninference Model.  A system is considered secure if and only if for any 
legal trace of system events, the trace results from the legal trace purged of all high-level 
events is still a legal trace of the system [23][24][27]. 
 
TrTrESNF h ∈∈∀≡ \:)( ττ        (1) 
 
Here, in order to make the security property easier to understand, an imaginary problem 
modeled after delivering pizzas to the Pentagon is constructed, the Pentagon-pizza shop 
example. There is a high-level set of events (experts arrive) that are supposed to be secret 
and a set of low-level events in which a pizza shop cooks and the Pentagon disposes of 
pizza. The events are depicted in Figure 2.2. The notation of system events are borrowed 








Figure 2.2 Pentagon-pizza shop example for noninference security property 
 
 
 Shown in Figure 2.2 are two systems, namely the Pentagon and the pizza shop. 














 If only consider the Pentagon system, the high-level events are Expert come and 
the number of the people who go eattoout __ , the low-level events are 
pizzanOrder __  and pizzanTrash __ . From a more substantiative point of view, if the 
Pentagon trashes regular numbers of pizza boxes everyday, these low-level events happen 
no matter what the high-level events are and the observers will not be able to infer if 
there are any high-level events (like any experts coming to Pentagon who require 
ordering pizza). If a system shares the same property as this Pentagon system, it satisfies 
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the noninference security property as described in (1). The pizza shop is another example 
that satisfies the noninference security property for the same reason that purging the high-
level events leaves the low-level (observable) events unchanged. 
 2.1.2 Nondeducible Model.  A system is considered nondeducible secure if it is  
impossible for a low-level user, through observing visible events, to deduce anything 
about the sequence of inputs made by a high-level user.  In other words, system is 
nondeducible secure if the low-level observation is compatible with any of the high-level 
inputs. [21][23][24] 
 
IHLhHL TrTrESND ∩∩∀=∈∃∈∀≡ |\::,)( ττττττ    (2) 
 
The Pentagon-pizza shop example is also used here (shown in Figure 2.3) to illustrate the 
nonduducible security property. In this figure, the possibility that the composed system 
doesn't satisfy the nondeducible property is illustrated as well. 
 In Figure 2.3, Pentagon and Pizza shop are still used as the systems to illustrate 













 If the Pentagon system is considered in isolation from the low-level observation, 
the observer should not be able to infer Even# and Odd# are introduced by either 0,1 or 
more Expert come events. Any system sharing the same property as the Pentagon system, 
in which the low-level observation is compatible with any of the high-level inputs, 
satisfies the nondeducible security property defined in (2). However, the composability of 
the nondeducible security property needs to be pointed out as shown on the right side of 
Figure 2.3. Although the Pentagon system and the pizza shop system satisfy the 
nondeducible security property individually, when composed together, the composed 
system no longer satisfy the nondeducible security property since, when the observer 
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observes Even# from one side and Odd# from the other side, s/he will infer that there 

















































Figure 2.3 Pentagon-pizza shop example for nondeducible security property 
 
 
 2.1.3 Bisimulation-based Nondeducibility on Composition Model.  A system 
is considered to have the Bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility on Composition (BNDC) 
property, if it can preserve its security after composition. [6][8] A system ES  is BNDC if 
for every high-level process P , a low-level user cannot distinguish ES  from 
HActPES \)|(  ( ES  composed with any other process P  and purged high-level events). 
In other words, a system ES  is BNDC if what a low-level user sees of the system is not 





 Formally BNDC can be defined as: ES is BNDC if and only if 
 
HBHH ESESESBNDC ττ \)/(/,)( Π≈Ε∈Π∀≡      (3) 
 
Note: here HES τ/  means turn all the high-level events in ES  to internal events. BNDC 
can be illustrated with a very similar Pentagon-pizza shop example as in Figure 2.3 by 
adding an internal event that leads to a high-level output. In this case, the system can be 
composed with any other system but from the observation point of view (bisimulation), 
the system satisfies the BNDC property. 
 2.1.4 Bell-LaPadula Model.  Different from those security models mentioned  
above, the Bell-LaPadula model is an access control model which offers more tangible 
security rules that can be enforced during execution. In the Bell-LaPadula model [2], all 
entities are divided into subjects and objects. Subjects are active entities, while objects 
are passive containers for information. The Bell-LaPadula model sets up rules for 
untrusted subjects: 
 Untrusted subjects may only read from objects of lower or equal security level 
 Untrusted process may only write to objects of greater or equal security level 
 2.1.5 Applicability.  The CFPS system fits within the multi-level security  
structure. To analyze the information flow of CFPS more effectively, the security models 
defined above are used. The noninference property might be too strong in some systems 
where the low-level inputs result in high-level outputs. However, the noninference model 
can be applied in this information flow analysis for the principle components of UPFC 
devices because no low-level input results in high-level outputs in the systems being 
analyzed. The nondeducible security property is used to analyze the system where high-
level outputs are observable. According to [21], if an entire system is nondeducible 
secure, then no low-level user of that system will ever learn any high-level information 
through the system. The BNDC security model has the advantage that if systems satisfy 
the BNDC property, they are composable. Furthermore, the BNDC is compatible with 
noninference and nondeducible security properties. The Bell-LaPadula model is used to 





2.2 SECURITY PROCESS ALGEBRA (SPA) AND PERSISTENT SECURITY 
PROPERTY CHECKING TOOL – COPS 
  
 In order to formalize the security models described in last section, this thesis uses 
security process algebra (SPA) to formalize the behavior of the system and uses CoPS as 
an automatic tool to check the system's security property against security properties that 
can be checked by CoPS. 
 2.2.1 SPA.  Security Process Algebra (SPA, for short) is an extension of Calculus 
of Communicating Systems (CCS) [26] - a language proposed to specify concurrent 
systems, that defines algebra consisting of operators for building systems using a bottom-
up approach from smaller subsystems. The basic building blocks are atomic activities, 
called actions; unlike CCS, in SPA, actions belong to two different levels of 
confidentiality, thus allowing the specification of multilevel (actually, two-level) systems. 
The BNF Syntax of SPA to describe the system is [9]: 
 
ZfELELELEEEEEEE I |][|/|\|\||||.|0:: 2121 += µ  
 
where 0 is the empty process, which cannot do any action; E.µ can do action µ and then 
behaves like E ; 21 EE + can alternatively choose to behave like 1E  or 2E ; 21 | EE  is the 
parallel composition of 1E  and 2E , where the executions of the two systems are 
interleaved, LE \  can execute all the actions E  is able to do, provided that they do not 
belong to LL ∪ ; LE I\  requires that the actions of E  do not belong to IL ∩ ; LE /  
turns all the actions in L  into internal τ 's; if E  can execute action µ , then ][ fE  
performs )(µf ; finally, Z  does what E  does, if EdefZ . 
 As an example of using SPA, consider an imaginary system, ES, that leaks 
information from a high-level security entity to the low-level. ES has no constraints on 














where N  is the event set that ES does not allow. In the above description: Object refer to 
any security entities and it has parameter l  which could be high  or low  to indicate the 
security level of object and parameter y to indicate the current status of y (in this example, 
a value is used to indicate the current state). read  and write  refer to the action that this 
system allowed. R  and W refer to the real final output of reading result or the input of 
writing result. 

























This sequence can be interpreted as: a low level ( 0=l ) object read the high level ( 1=l ) 
object and get its status ( 5=y ) and write it to itself ( 50,0 →== yl ) , later any low 
level object can read this low level object and get the status ( 5=y ) which leaks the 
information. 
 2.2.2 CoPS. CoPS is an automatic checker of multilevel system's security  
properties [20]. In particular, CoPS checks the three security properties: Bisimulation-
based Non-Deducibility on Composition (BNDC), Strong Bisimulation-based Non-
Deducibility on Composition (SBNDC) and, Persistent BNDC (P BNDC) [6] [7] [8]. 
These are Non-Interference properties [24] which imply the Bisimulation-based Non-
Deducibility on Composition [6] [8]. In this case, the CoPS is chosen to check the 
modeled behavior of CFPS to see if it satisfies the BNDC which is compatible with the 
noninference and nondeducible security properties. 
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 The SPA discussed in the last section can be converted to code that is compatible 
with CoPS syntax and checked automatically by CoPS against security properties that 
reorganized in CoPS. The conversion takes several steps as: 
 CoPS has keywords as shown in Table 2.2. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Keywords defined by CoPS 
Keyword Meaning 
bi Bind (agent) identifier 
basi Bind action set identifier 
acth  Bind an action set to Act_H, the high level actions 
 
 
 Identify security objects (defined as agent in CoPS using keyword bi)  
 Identify objects' actions (defined as action set in CoPS using keyword basi) 
 Classify security levels to each action and clarify high-level actions (defined as 
high-level actions in CoPS using keyword acth) 
 Rewrite the system behavior with above identified items 
 In order to illustrate the syntax of CoPS the small imaginary system used in the 




  (Action |Obj_l0 | Obj_h5)\L 
 
bi Action 
  read_ll.rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + 
  read_hh.rh5.'val_h5.Behavior + 
  read_lh.rl5.'val_h5.Behavior + 
  read_hl.rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + 
  write_ll.'wl0.Behavior +  
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  write_lh.'wh0.Behavior +  
  write_hl.'wl5.Behavior +  
  write_hh.'wh5.Behavior 
 
bi  Obj_l0  
 'rl0.Obj_l0 + wl0.Obj_l0 + wl0.Obj_l5 
 
bi  Obj_l5 
 'rl5.Obj_l5  + wl5.Obj_l0 + wl5.Obj_l5 
 
bi  Obj_h0  
 'rh0.Obj_h0 + wh0.Obj_h0 + wh0.Obj_h5  
 
bi  Obj_h5  
 'rh5.Obj_h5 + wh5.Obj_h0 + wh1.Obj_h5 
 
basi L 
  rh0  rh5  rl0  rl5  
  wh0  wh5  wl0  wl5  
 
basi N 
 val_h0 val_h5 
 val_l0 val_l5 
 read_hh read_hl read_lh read_ll 
 write_hh write_hl write_lh write_ll 
 
 
acth     
 val_h0 val_h5   
 rh0 rh5 wh0 wh5 read_hh 
 write_hh write_hl 
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 With the above code, the CoPS checks the behavior of the described system and 
finds it does not satisfy any recognized security properties, such as the BNDC. This is the 
same as the result in last section. 
 In the remainder of this thesis, information flow in CPSs will be discovered by 
using the SPA discussed to model system behavior and codes are written to check system 
behavior against security properties that are defined in CoPS. The later analysis of 
information flow problems resulting from system behavior is very similar to the small 




3. INFORMATION FLOWS IN CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
 Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are integrations of computation with physical 
processes. The embedded computers and networks used to monitor and control the 
physical processes, usually include feedback loops where physical processes affect 
computations and vice versa[5]. The cyber and physical interactions have the potential to 
leak information from the system to the outside world. In this section, the CFPS is used 
as an example to illustrate possible information flow in a CPS. 
 Lack of confidentiality of information flow can have catastrophic effects. As an 
example, consider an instance of the IEEE 118 bus system [3][19]. This is a highly 
stressed system with many lines near overload. There are critical lines that, if removed, 
will cause cascading failures throughout the system. From the analysis in [3][19], if line 
4-5 is removed, line 5-11 will be overloaded and be tripped later, then line 7-12 will be 
overloaded and tripped, then other lines will be overloaded and lead to a cascading failure. 
If attackers know these critical lines together with a good guess of line capacity, they can 
carry out an effective attack causes a cascading failure of the system simply by physically 
removing a critical line. The confidential information leaked by information flow will 
assist or accelerate the attackers. 
 
3.1 DEFINING INFORMATION FLOW IN CFPS 
 In the CFPS, decisions are made cooperatively and distributively. The decision-
making information is what needs to be kept confidential. The internal settings and 
control operations of a single FACTS device or the CFDs are defined as confidential in 
[28]. Current work follows their definition of confidential information (as shown in Table 
3.1, adapted from Table 2 in [28]) to analyze the information flow in the CFPS. 
 The CFPS is made up of 3 security levels (shown in Table 3.2). In the high-level 
domain, communication is done by the Long Term Control. In the medium-level domain, 
the Dynamic Control and Power Electronics have implicit communication with other 
FACTS devices. At the low-level security domain, the settings of the power line cause 
implicit communication in the power network. The implicit communication is done when 
the power setting of ControlledLine(s) is changed and the whole system's power flow 
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redistributes correspondingly as shown in Figure 3.1. This kind of communication is due 
to the interconnected nature of power networks. Failure of confidentiality in the system is 
defined as leakage of higher level (including the high-level and medium-level security 




Table 3.1 Confidential information in CFPS 






Obtain and pass computed 








Data necessary to implement 
distributed max flow algorithm 








Information necessary for 




Table 3.2 Security levels in Cooperating FACTS Power System 
Security Security entities Reason 
High-level Long Term Control 
Parameters of CFPS 
Contains critical information for distributed 
control algorithm and calculated settings with 






Contains settings received from high-level 
security entity and will generate local settings 
according to local control algorithms 
Low-level ControlledLine 
Local power network 
Open access to some power lines or easy to 




Figure 3.1 Architecture of CFPS 
 
 
 In order to demonstrate the information flow clearly, following assumptions are 
made: 
Assumption 1: The message send by LTC is legitimate and correct. (The security of 
LTC itself is not taken into consideration in current work.) 
Assumption 2: The communication network which the LTCs used to pass the maxflow 
algorithm messages is secure. In other words, the communication between LTCs located 
in different UPFC devices is considered to be secure. 
Assumption 3: The power flow information of entire power network is secure, although 
some single power lines can be measured or a local topology is observable. 
 Assumptions 1 and 2 define the problem scope of this paper, which is confined to 
investigate the security of system information flow but not other security issues such as 
active attacks including maliciously changing the settings. Assumption 3 is made to 
analyze the system's information flow with the basic information that the possible 
attackers could find. 
 
3.2 FINDING THE INFORMATION FLOW IN CFPS 
 A bottom-up approach is used to find and analyze the information flow of CFPS. 
The CFPS is decomposed to the level of single components which are used to aggregate 
the UPFC device. The information flow is analyzed at the component level first, then 
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those components are composed to build UPFC device. The information flow at the 
UPFC device level is further investigated to reflect the security of the system. 
 3.2.1 Information Flow of the Components in the UPFC. The principal  
components of a UPFC device which include the LTC, Dynamic Control, DSP board and 
Power Electronics are depicted in Figure 1.1. The information flow of a UPFC device is 
shown in Figure 3.2, where each component is considered a security entity. Figure 3.3 
illustrates the information flow of the principle components building a UPFC device 
using the pictorial notation for the traces as introduced in [21]. Here, horizontal vectors 
represent inputs to and outputs from the system. The broken line represents the higher 




Figure 3.2 Information flow diagram of UPFC devices 
 
 
 A series of lemmas regarding the components of the UPFC device are proved as 
following. These are used to prove the property of noninference and other security 
properties of the composed system in later theorems. 
3.2.1.1 DSP board.  Lemma 1, the DSP operation is noninference secure. 
Proof: Seen from Figure 3.3, the DSP board is a non-deterministic system which is built 
up from traces of the following form:{{},e1,e3,e4,e1e2,e1e3,e1e4,e3e4, e1e2e3, 
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e1e2e4,e1e3e4,e1e2e3e4, …}(… stands for any interleavings of listed traces in the system), 
where e1 is a Low-level Input (LI) event; e2 is a High-level Output (HO) event; e3 is a 
High-level Input (HI) event and e4 is a HO event. This system satisfies the definition of 
noninference [24][25][27] because purging any legal trace of events not in low-level 
security domain, the result will either be e1 or {} which are both legal traces of the 
system, i.e., DSP Board system itself is a noninference secure system where no 
information flows from the high level security domain interfere with (the interference 
used in this paper refer to the events from other domain than the observer belongs to, that 





















































Figure 3.3 Information flow of principle components of UPFC 
 
 




Proof: the Dynamic Control system is a non-deterministic system, shown in Figure 3.3(b), 
that contains traces of the following form: {{},e1,e2,e1e3,e1e2,e2e3,e1e2e3, …}, where e1 is 
a LI event, e2 is a HI event and e3 is a HO event.  When project any legal trace to the low-
level security domain or purge any events that not in the low level security domain, the 
result will be either e1 or {}, which are also legal traces. Therefore, the Dynamic Control 
system satisfies the noninference security model.   
3.2.1.3 Long Term Control (LTC). The LTC system, which is a non- 
deterministic system shown in Figure 3.3(c), where all the events are high-level events. 
It's obvious that there is no interference between high-level security domain and the 
lower level security domain in LTC system. In other words, there is no information flow 
out of the high-level security domain. Proving this in the perspective of information flow 
is trivial.   
3.2.1.4 Power Electronics.  Lemma 3, the Power Electronics operation is not  
noninference secure. 
Proof: the Power Electronics event system, shown in Figure 3.3(d), simply contains 
traces: {{}, e1, e1e2, …}.  When project any legal traces to the low-level security domain, 
the result will be either e2 or {}, where e2 is not a legal trace in this system. i.e., the power 
electronics system is not noninference secure. In this system e1(HI) infers e2(LO), which 
means if e2 happens e2 must happen before.   
 The causal relationship between e1 and e2 is where the information has been 
downgraded and passed to the lower security domain.  This system is not secure not only 
in the perspective of interface models, but also in the view of access control models such 
as the Bell-LaPadula model [2] since there is information classified as higher level has 
been written to the low level domain, which violates the second rule of the Bell-LaPadula 
model.  
 3.2.2 Information Flow of the Composition of Components into the UPFC. 
The UPFC device is able to work only when all the components mentioned above 
compose together and work properly. In this section, the composed UPFC devices will be 
discussed with and without considering the internal events respectively. After the 
components are composed to form the UPFC device, the information flows between 
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components inside UPFC device are internal information flows (shown in Figure 3.4) and 








Figure 3.5 Information flow analysis at UPFC device level – external flow only 
 
 
Theorem 1, Considering the external events only, the composition of DSP, Dynamic 
Control, LTC and Power electronics forming the UPFC device is noninference secure. 
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Proof: From Lemma 1, 2, the DSP and Dynamic Control are noninference secure.  
Connecting DSP and the Dynamic Control with the LTC, it is still noninference secure. 
The result of Lemma 3 does not invalidate the noninference secure property of these 
components composed with power electronics. Observing Figure 3.5 and taking the 
UPFC device without considering the internal events, it is a non-deterministic system that 
contains traces {{},e1,e3,e5, e1e3, e1e5,e3e5,e1e3e5, …}(The composed system's boundary is 
at UPFC device as shown in Figure 3.5).  The projection of these external events traces 
for the UPFC device to the low-level domain is either {} or e3 which are legal traces (the 
only observable low-level event – the sensor reading event can happen without the 
occurrence of any higher level events). That means the UPFC device, considering only 
the external events, is a noninference secure system. The UPFC device is noninference 
secure so that attackers cannot infer the higher level behavior simply from observing low-
level events.   
 This noninference secure property proved in Theorem 1 is achieved without 
observation of power flow, in other words, the system boundary under consideration is 
the UPFC device itself but not the ControlledLine linked to the UPFC device. Since the 
attacker usually will not be able to attack the UPFC device itself due to the physical 
protection such as those required by CIP-006-1, the system boundary can stop at the 
ControlledLine. Usually the ControlledLine is more prone to be attacked due to its 
physical nature of open access. 
Theorem 2, the system constructed of the UPFC device connected with the 
ControlledLine is nondeducible secure. 
Proof: Observing the event system at ControlledLine from Figure 3.4, the system 
contains traces {{}, e1e4, e2e4, e1e2e4, …}, where e4 is LO event, both e1 and e2 are HI 
events.  This system is not noninference secure because the projection of the legal trace to 
the low level domain ({e4}) is not a legal trace.  However, the system with the boundary 
at the ControlledLine satisfies nondeducible security property [24][25][27], because 
every high level input (either e1, e2 or both e1 and e2) are compatible with the low level 
output (e4).   
 As shown in Figure 3.4, the changes of ControlledLine can be affected by the 
local settings from Dynamic Control or by the other LTC settings that propagate through 
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the power network. Even more, it could be affected by the topology change of power 
lines (such as a line trip), which triggers the redistribution of the power flow for the 
system. That is to say, by only observing the events interfering with the ControlledLine, 
no clue of where the information is from can be formed. 
 That the UPFC device (with the boundary at ControlledLine) satisfies the 
nondeducible security model seems to be a very favorable result, even during building the 
UPFC devices, a component which is not secure (as from Lemma 3 where the Power 
Electronics downgrades the information to a low-level domain), the system is still secure 
considering the external information flow interference. From the interface model point of 
view, the system is secure such that no confidential information is exposed through 
information flow. In the real system, however, the ControlledLine is observable, and this 
introduces a new vulnerability.  
 3.2.3 Information Flow at the Cyber-Physical Boundary. Given the results of 
previous sections, is this system really secure considering other types of inference? By 
measuring power flow in or out of the UPFC device, can the high-level actions be 
deduced? Due to the nature of the electric power network, its physical infrastructures are 
exposed outside and prone to be attacked easily. Taking the UPFC device as an example 
and considering only passive attacks such as attaching meters to measure the line voltage 
and current parameters, it is possible that these measured data could help to calculate the 
settings from the control devices of the Power System and infer the control operation 
accordingly. With a passive attack of using meters attached to the ControlledLine and 
with a reasonable amount of computation the "settings" of UPFC devices can be 
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Figure 3.6 Computation model of ControlledLine and the FACTS devices 
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Theorem 3, the UPFC settings can be deduced by computation with the low-level 
observation. 
Proof: In Figure 3.6, if take two measurement of three-phase instantaneous voltage and 
current information at both sides of the UPFC device ( ttV θ∠  and 22 θ∠V ), using 
Kirchhoff's law, the injected voltage injV  can be solved. The settings of UPFC from the 
Dynamic Control can be further calculated if injV  is known. This means the local settings 
can be observed (compromised) even with the information flow analysis that has been 
done in previous paragraphs.   
 In summary, the selected CPS has information flow out of the system at the 
cyber-physical boundary. A proper way to catch and model this information flow needs 
to be addressed. In next section, a process to model the information flow in a CPS is 




4. PROPOSED PROCESS TO MODEL CPS'S INFORMATION FLOW 
4.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
 As expressed in the last section, the can be leaked to the outside through cyber-
physical interactions. A process is proposed to model the information flow of a CPS. 
 The process of modeling information flow includes early steps of (1) eliciting 
security requirements by the misuse case and identifying nonfunctional requirements that 
tightly couple with the security requirements, (2) intermediate steps such as applying 
security models and modifying the models to suit the particular system, and (3) final 
steps of formally describing the system and checking system behavior against security 
properties. The entire process for modeling the information flow in a large system is 
shown in Figure 4.1. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to propose a feasible and effective 
process that can serve as a baseline to model the information flow security of a large CPS. 
 To illustrate the process and show its suitability for CPS, the CFPS continues to 
serve as the example. In the following sections, each step in this process is explained first 








4.2 STEPS OF THE INFORMATION FLOW MODELING PROCESS AND 
EXAMPLE OF CFPS 
 
 The process of modeling information flow security includes the following steps: 
security requirements elicit the misuse case, specify other non-functional requirements 
that have the potential to couple with the security requirements, analyze the elicited 
requirements using available security models and SPA, extend or modify the security 
model to adapt to the security of information flow; apply automatic checking. 
 4.2.1 Requirement Elicitation.  Misuse case is used to elicit the requirement for 
securities as the first step of modeling the information flow of Cyber-Physical System.  
4.2.1.1 Misuse case.  A misuse case is the inverse of a use case [11][12][13] 
i.e., a function that the system should not allow. A use case is defined as a completed 
sequence of actions which gives increased value to the user. One could define a misuse 
case as a completed sequence of actions which results in loss for the organization or some 
speci_c stakeholder. A mis-actor is parallel to an actor, i.e., an actor who does not want 
the system to function, an actor who initiates misuse cases. 
4.2.1.2 Misuse case of CFPS system.  As mentioned, the misuse case can be 
used to describe the system's undesired behavior. Figure 4.2 is a diagram that uses the 
concept of misuse case and mis-actor to illustrate the information flow of the FACTS 
system. A current misuse case is shown in Figure 4.2, developed from group discussions 
by the Power Research Group at the University of Missouri, Rolla. However, other 
techniques, such as attack trees, can also be used to aid the generation of misuse cases to 
a system. 
 From Figure 4.2, it can be found that the use cases in the rectangle with the 
broken line are fundamental to both passive and active attackers. From Table 4.1 to Table 
4.3, the same conclusion can be drawn namely, that the integrity and availability of the 
system is not independent of the confidentiality. Current work focuses on the 
confidentiality of the system. As shown in Table 4.1, SR 1.1.1, SR 1.2.1 and SR 1.3.1, 
physical protection to the device and the medium, needs to be applied. This thesis focuses 
only on the security requirement of the information flow of this system, which is mostly 






Figure 4.2 Misuse case of Flexible AC Transmission System 
 
 
 With the misuse case shown in Figure 4.2, some security requirements are elicited 
by considering the unveiled possible attacks, as shown in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Requirements for integrity 
Security Requirements (Integrity): -  
SR 2.1: The LTC's settings can not be changed 
SR 2.2: The dynamic control(DCtrl)'s settings can not be changed 
SR 2.3: The power electronics (PE)'s settings are confidential 
 
 
Table 4.2 Some requirements for availability 
Security Requirements (Availability): -  




Table 4.3 Requirements for confidentiality 
Security Requirements (Confidential): -  
SR 1.1: The LTC's settings are confidential 
  SR 1.1.1: Physical protection to LTC and the media that the settings are sent through 
  SR 1.1.2: The LTC's control settings are confidential 
  SR 1.1.3: The LTC's control operation are confidential 
SR 1.2: The dynamic control (DCtrl)'s settings are confidential 
  SR 1.2.1: Physical protection to DCtrl and the media that the settings are sent 
through 
  SR 1.2.2: The DCtrl's control settings are confidential 
  SR 1.2.3: The DCtrl's control operation are confidential 
SR 1.3: The power electronics (PE)'s settings are confidential 
  SR 1.3.1: Physical protection to PE and the media that the settings are sent through 
  SR 1.3.2: The PE's control settings are confidential 
  SR 1.3.3: The PE's control operation are confidential 
SR 1.4: No weak operation point of system can be deduced 
 
 
 4.2.2 Identify the Functional and Non-functional Requirements Behind the 
Misuse Cases.  Identify the functional and non-functional requirements that couple with 
the current security requirement is important to achieve a complete specification of the 
security requirement. Table 4.4 shows a sample of the timing requirements of the CFPS. 
The system's information flow security cannot be achieved without other functional and 
non-functional requirements working properly. 
 The current process of finding the coupling of functional and nonfunctional 
requirements with the security requirement is by excluding those requirements that are 
not related to the security requirements. In practice, any requirement that affects the same 
system parameters or system states will be considered as coupling with the security 
requirements that have been identified. This is not an effective strategy, as it covers many 
functional and nonfunctional requirements. However, it is worthy in the design and 
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analysis phase of the critical infrastructure. The strategy of purging the non-security 
related requirements can be changed and investigated in the future. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Sample of nonfunctional requirements[28][35] 
Requirements: -  
… 
Real time constrains: 
R x.1 The LTC's update rate of 10s 
R x.2 The dynamic control (DCtrl)'s update rate is 1ms 
R x.3 The power electronics (PE)'s update rate is 0.33s (300Hz) 




 4.2.3 Security Analysis Using Available Security Models.  Figure 4.3 shows the 
interaction between the FACTS device and the power system. Currently, the power 
system is modeled and represented by a simulation engine, which simulates an IEEE 118 
bus power system. Attackers are also shown in Figure 4.3. However, only the passive 
attackers have been considered in modeling the system information flow security. In 
Figure 4.3 both the FACTS device and the Simulation Engine are high-level objects. 
However, the ControlledLine(s) are considered to be low-level objects due to their open 
physical nature. 
 Here, the analysis of the FACTS system's information flow contains two parts 
which are similar to those discussed in Section 3.2.2. The analysis is done at two security 
boundaries, one is at the physical boundary of the FACTS device and the other makes the 
ControlledLine the security boundary since the ControlledLine is more or less an opened 
line. The information flow is as shown in Figure 3.5, in Section 3.2.2. 
 The CFPS system is a nondeterministic system; noninference and nondeducible 
are the two security models that can be used to do a static check for the information flow. 





















Figure 4.3 FACTS system interaction 
 
 
 Conclusion 1: The UPFC device is noninference secure if taking the UPFC's 
physical boundary as the security boundary 
 Conclusion 2: The UPFC device is nondeducible secure if taking the 
ControlledLine as the security boundary 
 The analysis from the events point of view has been given in Section 3.2.2. Here, 
in this step of the proposed process, the focus is on formal analysis using the SPA. 
4.2.3.1 Security analysis of conclusion 1 using the noninference security 
model.  A formal model can be applied to analyze Conclusion 1. Table 4.5 shows 
all the events that are allowed at the security boundary of UPFC devices. 
 
 
Table 4.5 Events and allowed access 
Events Type Implication 
e1 High-level subject (Power 
network) writes to high-level 
object (UPFC device) 
High-level subject (UPFC 
device) reads from high-level 
object(Power network) 
e3 Low-level subject 
(ControlledLine) writes to high-
level object (UPFC device) 
Low-level subject 
(ControlledLine) reads from low-
level object (local lines) 
e5 High-level subject (UPFC device)  
writes to low-level object 
(ControlledLine) 
High-level subject (UPFC 
device) reads from high-level 
object (UPFC device) 
  
32 
 Although Table 4.5 lists only the allowed events, the formal requirements should 
be able to capture both the illegal events and the invalid events. Equation (4) describes 
the behavior of the FACTS system if taking the physical boundary of the UPFC as the 
security boundary. The notion and value-passing SPA can be found in [15][16][27]. The 
analysis below follows the procedure that is described in Section 2.2. 
 
 






















),().,(),,0().,(),( yxObjectyxWtPObjectyxRyxObject +=    (4) 
 
 
Here ),(_/),(_ xlwriteMxlreadM  stand for events that subject of security level l 
read/write to an object of security level x. y and z are the values (or states) of the object. 
The above SPA describes the system behavior and possible executions. 
 Additional steps will be taken using the automatic checking tools to testify the 
above SPA described system satisfies predicates defined as the noninference security 
property, which is formalized in equation (1). 
 The FACTS system behavior can be shown as an access monitor for the UPFC 






Figure 4.4 UPFC device security boundary at devices physical boundary 
 
 
4.2.3.2 Formalize the security analysis of conclusion 2 shown in last section. 
Similarly, the information from Conclusion 2 is formalized. Table 4.6 shows all the 
events that are allowed at the security boundary of ControlledLine. 
 
 
Table 4.6 Events and allowed access 
Events Type Implication 
e1 High-level subject (Power 
network) writes to high-level 
object (UPFC device) 
High-level subject (UPFC device) 
reads from high-level object (Power 
network) 
e2 High-level subject (Power 
network) writes to low-level 
object (ControlledLine) 
High-level subject (Power network) 
reads from high-level object (Power 
network) 
e4 Low-level subject 
(ControlledLine) writes to high-
level object (Power network) 
Low-level subject (ControlledLine) 




 The SPA to describe the CFPS which takes the security boundary at the 
ControlledLine is very similar to the behavior of the CFPS with the security boundary at 
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Figure 4.5 UPFC device security boundary at ControlledLine 
 
 
 From Section 3.2.2, intuitively, the FACTS system, which has a security 
boundary at the ControlledLine, satisfies the nondeducible security model. Here the SPA 
defined in this section needs to check against the nondeducible security model as defined 
in equation (2). 
  
35 
 With the above formal descriptions of both the FACTS behavior at the boundary 
of ControlledLine and the nondeducible property, the automatic property checking tools 
are ready to be applied to prove the security property of the FACTS system. 
 4.2.4 Beyond the Available Security Models.  The security requirements are  
easy to couple with other kinds of requirements such as nonfunctional requirements, e.g. 
performance requirements (CPU burst can be encoded as '1' and CPU low usage can be 
encoded as a '0', which can make a covert channel). Various kinds of nonfunctional 
requirements can be coupled with the security requirements. This phenomenon occurs 
frequently in the cyber-physical world. In this case a security model that contains pure 
security considerations might only reflect one side of the problem. In order to add more 
perspectives to the problem, the security models selected to analyze the information flow 
are changed to include information about other requirements. 
 In the CFPS, the security requirement of information security has the potential of 
coupling with the real-time requirement of the system. However, the security models that 
are widely used do not always consider real-time or temporal behavior of the system. The 
analysis in the previous section, which uses the current available security models, cannot 
illustrate the possible security issues involving these temporal aspects. The system 
behavior with timing is shown in Figure 4.6. 
 Observe Figure 4.6, if the attacker passively attaches power flow meters to the 
low-level object (ControlledLine in the FACTS system) to log the line flow data, the 
attacker could observe some significant changes of the line flow at certain time intervals 
and infer the system update rate. For example, the following data gives a glimpse of a 
line flow log. Here, the data are based on lab data which is aiming at testing the load 
change and the FACTS device's response. 
 From this trace (shown in Table 4.7), it can be seen that the attacker gathers the 
line flow information every 5ms. In other words, it has a sampling rate of 200Hz. 
Observing the change rate of the line flow, the attacker can infer that after a significant 
line flow change (at 190505ms), at least every 5ms, there is a change that causes the line 
flow to drop. However, around every 100ms, the line flow will be balanced back to a 
higher setting. Knowledgeable attackers could start a brief analysis of the power system 





























Figure 4.6 Intuitive analysis of system behavior with temporal consideration 
 
 
 190505 ms, some contingency happens (location not yet known) that causes the 
ControlledLine to have a flow change of around 20% 
 At least every 5ms, the line flow drops by 2%, which means there is something 
withdrawing power flow from the ControlledLine at least every 5ms 
 At least every 100ms, the line flow is changed by 6%, which means there is some 
other mechanism injecting power flow to the ControlledLine at least every 100ms 
 With the above observation and some guess work, the attacker obtains knowledge 
about the system response time with the FACTS device on, which is around 5-100ms. 
 The above analysis regarding the system's behavior, with temporal constraints 
taken into consideration, is based on some lab experience. A formal description needs to 
be given in order to use a model checking tool to prove the correctness of the security of 
information flow with timing considerations. Some literature [7][8][15] was introduced 
ways of adapting time in the security model. The security models built in Section 4.2.3 
are also modified to reflect the temporal constraints of the system and show whether the 
coupling of nonfunctional requirements such as the real-time requirement, in this case, 




Table 4.7 Timestamped observation of ControlledLine 



















 As in [8] and [15], time is represented by a tick to describe the system's time in a 
discrete manner according to the global clock. (e.g. system = write. . .system), where 
internal events will always follow write events and take a unit of time. In the current 
approach, to include the temporal constraints in the SPA, the FACTS system's behavior is 
chosen by extending the value passing SPA by one more value, the time interval. The line 
flow change observation is based on the information of ControlledLine, so the security 
boundary of the FACTS device was set to the ControlledLine. In the previous section, 
system behavior observed at ControlledLIne was found to be nondeducible secure. With 
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 Figure 4.7 shows the CFPS behavior with timing constraints. After the formal 
expression of the system's execution sequence and the temporal constraints, the models 
can be used to feed in the model checking tools. As seen from the informal analysis, the 
conclusion has been drawn that the real-time constraints do affect the security properties. 
In this case, the security requirement on information flow needs to be updated (as shown 








Table 4.8 System requirement for confidentiality 
Security Requirements (Confidential): -  
SR 1.1: The LTC's settings are confidential 
SR 1.2: The dynamic control (DCtrl)'s settings are confidential 
SR 1.3: The power electronics (PE)'s settings are confidential 
SR 1.4: No weak operation point of system can be deduced 
… 
Updated: SR 1.*: System operation time can not be deduced 
 
 
 4.2.5 Apply the Automatic Checking Tools.  Applying model checking tools to   
the security models that are developed for the system is a significant step to prove the 
correctness of the current security requirements and to find new security needs based on 
the results of checking. In this thesis, the effort is mostly spent on preparing formal 
descriptions for current system behavior and the security models that can be fed to the 
selected checker or some other security property checking tools. However, if the security 
properties can be formalized as to which kinds are suitable for any model checking tools, 
those security properties can also be checked by available model checkers[28][29] other 
than CoPS. The following section will discuss formalizing the security properties 





 One of the most significant points in the proposed information flow modeling 
process for CPS is that the modeling process is not only aimed at describing the 
information flow model but also at providing a strategy to check the available model so 
that the result can be fed back to improve the security of a system at design time. The 
security property modeled following that process needs to be checked when the models 
are formalized. In this section, a persistent security property checking tool is applied to 
do the automatic checking. The correctness of the selected security models used to define 
the CPS is checked. The results from this formal checking can either prove the security of 
current CPSs or be valuable feedback to be added to or modify the security requirements 
of the system. As mentioned earlier, the SPA was chosen to formalize the security 
property and CoPS is chosen as the automatic formal security property checking tool. The 
security models described using SPA in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 were modified to be 
compatible with the CoPS syntax in this section and then fed to CoPS to get the result. 
 
5.1 USING SPA TO DEFINE THE CFPS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF 
TIMING INFORMATION 
 
 Before considering any timing information in the CFPS, the system's behaviors 
modeled in Section 4.2.3 using SPA are rewritten using syntax provided by CoPS. 
 5.1.1 Security Boundary at UPFC Device Level.  According to Conclusion 1 
the system satisfies the noninference security property [27] considering the UPFC 
system's security boundary at the UPFC device level [36]. The system behavior is defined 
using SPA in Section 4.2.3 as shown in equation (4). Here system behavior is further 
modified to satisfy the syntax of CoPS as shown in Table 5.1 and fed into the CoPS to 
check against the security property of BNDC. 
 
//this simulation is for the security boundary at UPFC device level 
//without considering any timing issues. here value 0 means initial 




(UPFC | LTC)\N 
bi UPFC 
(Behavior | HIL_h0 | HIL_l0)\L 
bi Behavior 
access_r_ll.(rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + rl1.'val_l1.Behavior) + 








'rl0.HIL_l0 + wl0.HIL_l0 + wl1.HIL_l1 
bi HIL_l1 
'rl1.HIL_l1 + wl0.HIL_l0 + wl1.HIL_l1 
bi HIL_h0 
'rh0.HIL_h0 + wh0.HIL_h0 + wh1.HIL_h1 
bi HIL_h1 
'rh1.HIL_h1 + wh0.HIL_h0 + wh1.HIL_h1 
bi LTC 




rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1 




access_r_hh access_r_hl access_r_lh access_r_ll 
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access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1 
access_w_lh0 access_w_lh1 access_w_ll0 access_w_ll1 
acth 
a_r_hh a_r_hl 
a_w_hh0 a_w_hh1 a_w_hl0 a_w_hl1 
put_h0 put_h1 
val_h0 val_h1 
rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh access_r_hl 
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1 
 
 5.1.2 Security Boundary at the ControlledLine Level. The ControlledLine  
is easier to attack compared to the UPFC device at the device boundary due to the 
physical security protection of the system. The UPFC system's security boundary is 
extended to the ControlledLine. Section 3.2.2 shows the UPFC system, taking the 
security boundary at the ControlledLine, and satisfying the nondeducible security 
property. The system's behaviors are described using SPA in Section 4.2.3 as shown in 
equation (5). 
 The above model has been converted into codes that are compatible with CoPS 
syntax as shown in Table 5.2. Those codes will be checked against the BNDC property. If 
this model satis_es the BNDC property, that means, the UPFC system can be composed 
with any other system that also satis_es BNDC to build a larger system. 
 
//this simulation is for the security boundary at ControlledLine level 
//without considering any timing issues 
//here value 0 means initial value, 1 means it could be set 
//to a new value 
bi CL_NT 
(CL | LTC)\N 
//here consider the LTC objects and the internal events brought by LTC 
bi CL 




access_r_ll.(rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + rl1.'val_l1.Behavior) + 








'rl0.HIL_l0 + wl0.HIL_l0 + wl1.HIL_l1 
bi HIL_l1 
'rl1.HIL_l1 + wl0.HIL_l0 + wl1.HIL_l1 
bi HIL_h0 
'rh0.HIL_h0 + wh0.HIL_h0 + wh1.HIL_h1 
bi HIL_h1 
'rh1.HIL_h1 + wh0.HIL_h0 + wh1.HIL_h1 
bi LTC 
a_r_hh.'access_r_hh.(val_h0.'put_h0.LTC + 




rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1 




access_r_hh access_r_hl access_r_lh access_r_ll 
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1 





a_w_hh0 a_w_hh1 a_w_hl0 a_w_hl1 
put_h0 put_h1 
val_h0 val_h1 
rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh 
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1 
 
5.2 USING SPA TO DEFINE THE CFPS WITH CONSIDERATION OF TIMING 
INFORMATION 
 
 Various researchers have worked on theoretical information flow property 
analysis for several years. However, the uniqueness of this work is in using a tangible 
example, the CFPS system, to illustrate the security properties that are developed from 
the theory. Furthermore, this work extends the model to consider the physical nature of 
the system. The physical nature of the system cannot be ignored since that is how the 
system works and some of the inherited physical nature will affect the cyber system in a 
CPS. 
 Currently, to the best of the author's knowledge, there is little literature [15] that 
describes a system's information property together with timing constraints. In order to 
include timing in the model, a special operation called "tick" is used. "Tick" does nothing 
but act as an atomic operation and represent the clock of the whole system moving by one 
unit of time. 
 Figure 5.1 lists the timing constraints of the CFPS system and also the 
corresponding number of ticks that had been used in the checking. The actual frequency 
ratio between the objects is 1000:330:1, however, in the model a reduced number of ticks 
is used to reduce the complexity of model checking. The pattern of the frequencies is kept 
close to this ratio, but is not exact. 
After defining "tick" to represent the time lapse of the system, the models which 
use SPA can be modified. The UPFC system with both the security boundary at device 
level and the ControlledLine level have all been analyzed by adding the timing 
constraints as adding some "tick" after corresponding activities. The behavior of the 
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UPFC system is described in Table 5.3 to demonstrate the model of UPFC with the 
security boundary at the UPFC device. Another model of the UPFC system with the 








 A SPA model of the UPFC system, which has the security boundary at the UPFC 
device, has the following timing constraints: 
 
//this simulation is for the security boundary at UPFC device level 
//considering any timing issues 
//here value 0 means initial value, 1 means it could be set 
//to a new value 
bi UPFC_NT 
(UPFC | LTC)\N 
bi UPFC 
(Behavior | HIL_h0 | HIL_l0)\L 
bi Behavior 
access_r_ll.(rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + rl1.'val_l1.Behavior) + 










'rl0.HIL_l0 + wl0.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l0 + wl1.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l1 
bi HIL_l1 
'rl1.HIL_l1 + wl0.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l0 + wl1.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l1 
bi HIL_h0 
'rh0.HIL_h0 + wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h0 
+ wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h1 
bi HIL_h1 
'rh1.HIL_h1 + wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h0 
+ wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h1 
bi LTC 




rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1 





access_r_hh access_r_hl access_r_lh access_r_ll 
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1 
access_w_lh0 access_w_lh1 access_w_ll0 access_w_ll1 
acth 
a_r_hh a_r_hl 





rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh access_r_hl 
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1 
 
 SPA model of UPFC system, which has the security boundary at the 
ControlledLine, considering timing constraints: 
 
 
//this simulation is for the security boundary at ControlledLine level 
//without considering any timing issues 
//here value 0 means initial value, 1 means it could be set 
//to a new value 
bi CL_NT 
(CL | LTC)\N 
bi CL 
(Behavior | HIL_h0 | HIL_l0)\L 
bi Behavior 
access_r_ll.(rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + rl1.'val_l1.Behavior) + 








'rl0.HIL_l0 + wl0.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l0 + wl1.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l1 
bi HIL_l1 




'rh0.HIL_h0 + wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h0 
+ wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h1 
bi HIL_h1 








rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1 





access_r_hh access_r_hl access_r_lh access_r_ll 
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1 
access_w_lh0 access_w_lh1 access_w_ll0 access_w_ll1 
acth 
a_r_hh 
a_w_hh0 a_w_hh1 a_w_hl0 a_w_hl1 
put_h0 put_h1 
val_h0 val_h1 
rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh 






5.3 RESULTS FROM THE CHECKER OF PERSISTENT SECURITY 
PROPERTY (COPS) 
 
 System behaviors are described in SPA and fed into CoPS to check against the 
security property of BNDC. The results are in Table 5.1. These results include the UPFC 
system which has the security boundary at the device level or at the ControlledLine. 
 
 











UPFC Device (No time 
constraints) 
Yes 36 V: 34 
E: 52 
0.18 Yes 
ControlledLine (No time 
constraints) 
Yes 36 V: 34 
E: 52 
0.18 Yes 
UPFC Device (With 
time constraints) 










 From the results listed in Table 5.1, conclusions can be drawn that for the security 
properties of UPFC system, without considering the timing constraints, whether the 
security boundary stops at the UPFC device or the ControlledLine, the UPFC system 
satisfies BNDC. This is a stricter result than those stated in Section 3.2.2, since Section 
3.2.2 only claims the UPFC system with the security boundary at UPFC device level 
satisfies the noninference security property and with the security boundary at 
ControlledLine, satisfies nondeducible security property. However, as stated in [12], 
some systems that satisfy the nondeducible security property are not composable. This 




 The current result is favorable since the UPFC system with the security boundary 
at ControlledLine not only satisfies the property of nondeducible but also satisfies the 
BNDC, which is a composable security property. The system satisfies the BNDC because 
the internal events brought by LTC have been taken into consideration. These internal 
events lead to 4e . Being more specific, the event system described in 3.2.2, shown in 
Figure 3.5, has been modified to allow 4e  to be a legal trace in the system by introducing 
the internal event τ . The system traces became {{}, .e4, e1e4, e2e4, e1e2e4, …}. This 
system satisfies the BNDC since from the observation point of view the observed result is 
compatible with any high-level input even when composed with other systems [9]. 
Besides considering the composability in a CPS, timing constraints are also significant 
aspects. The UPFC system is also modeled in SPA with time taken into consideration. 
Table 5.1 provides those results that fed the SPA models to CoPS with timing. 
Unfortunately, UPFC system does not satisfy the security property of BNDC whether 
having the security boundary stop at the UPFC device or the ControlledLine. Besides not 
satisfying BNDC, the UPFC system with timing constraints is not composable. 
 The UPFC system with timing does not satisfy the BNDC security property. 
Intuitively, the divergence from BNDC by adding timing information to the UPFC 
system points out it is highly possible that timing constraints can be deduced or inferred 
by the observer since time lapse is a common event, which cannot be avoided in physical 
systems. It is something both trusted security domains and others can observe. An 
experiment is conducted to prove it is the pattern of timing constraints that introduces 
inference into the UPFC system. In this experiment, instead of classifying "tick" as a low-
level event (naturally, it is a low-level event that can be observed by any level of security 
domain as long as a global clock exists), "tick" is classified as high-level event, and the 
CoPS tools has been rerun to check against the security property of BNDC. This 
experiment proves the initial guess that timing constraints introduce the possibility of 
inferences. One more item of security requirements need to be added to the system to 
demonstrate the need of removing the timing inference in the system. One possible 
solution to this problem is to introduce obfuscation into the system and mask the 
frequency pattern. Further research work needs to be conducted. 
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 BNDC is important as CPSs are usually more or less composed of various 
physical and cyber systems. This fact shows the importance of composability to the 
security property, where composability means one or more composable secured systems. 
When composed together, their security properties will be preserved. In this way, no 
extra effort needs to be spent to prove the security of the system-of-system if every 
subsystem is secure and satisfies composable security properties.  
 Furthermore, an approach of proving the security of the system-of-system is 
implied here. Formally proving that the subsystems satisfy some composable security 
properties, such as BNDC, then directly composing these systems with other systems that 
satisfy composable security properties, results in a system-of-system that should satisfy 
the security property. To better illustrate this process, Figure 5.2 shows the process of 




















Figure 5.2 Process of using formal checking tool to prove the security property and 







 This thesis pointed out the importance of information flow security in a CPS, 
provided a process to model the information flow in a CPS, and suggested formalizing 
the system and using automatic checking tools to prove security properties. 
 
6.1 CPS'S INFORMATION FLOW NEED TO BE CONSIDERED 
 This thesis analyzed the information flow in the CFPS. Under Assumptions 1, 2 
and 3 described in Section 3.1, the UPFC local setting is confidential by considering the 
interface security models. However, the settings can still be deduced by mathematical 
computation with enough measurements taken from the ControlledLine(s), at the cyber-
physical boundary. Meanwhile, UPFC control operations such as the Dynamic Control 
operation and Long Term Control operation cannot be inferred from observing the low-
level behavior of CFPS. This is a promising result that shows considering the information 
flow of the CFPS, the confidentiality of the UPFC data setting and the control operations 
are not broken by inference or deducing information from information flow. This kind of 
self-obfuscation, in which the internal events of a system can obfuscate the system's 
behavior so that the external observer will not be able to deduce information from the 
system, not only appears in the power system but also in some other CPS such as oil 
pipeline systems, air traffic control systems and transportation systems. However, careful 
analysis is still needed at the cyber-physical boundaries since the cyber-physical 
interactions tend to leak the information to the outside world. This motivates a process or 
the modeling of the information flow of CPS. 
 
6.2 A PROCESS TO MODEL INFORMATION FLOW IN CYBER-PHYSICAL 
SYSTEM IS POSSIBLE 
 
 The proposed process is suitable for a large system, which possibly has some 
other functional or non-functional requirements that mix with the security requirement. 





Table 6.1 Conclusions and artifacts from the process of modeling information flow in 
Cyber-Physical System 
Step 1: Elicit Information flow security requirements from misuse case 
Conclusion: It's possible and effective to use the misuse case to identify security 
requirements together with the system information flow model. System information flow 
security requirements can be elicited in this way. 
Artifacts:  
(1) Misuse case 
(2) System information diagram 
(3) Security requirement (CIA) 
(4) Information ow security requirements 
Step 2: Identify functional or nonfunctional requirements related to the security 
requirements 
Conclusion: A strategy can be used to search the functional and nonfunctional 
requirements to find the possible requirement that couples with the system information 
flow security requirements. 
Artifacts:  
(1) Nonfunctional requirements list (temporal requirements) couple with the information 
flow security requirements 
Step 3: Apply available security models and formal evaluation 
Conclusion: Available security properties and models that are widely used in 
the defense community can be used to formalize a large system as long as it 
can be broken into smaller subsystems which are composable 
Artifacts:  
(1) Formal description of the system behavior using value passing SPA 
(2) Formal description of the security models (noninference and nondeducible) using 
value passing SPA 
Step 4: Extend security model according to the information analysis and formal 
evaluation 
Conclusion: Considering the system's temporal constraints, the security models used in 




Table 6.1 Conclusions and artifacts from the process of modeling information flow in 
Cyber-Physical System (cont.) 
Artifacts:  
(1) Formal description of the system behavior and temporal constraints using value 
passing SPA 
step 5: Apply automatic tools to do the formal checking 
Conclusion: System behavior described in step 3 and 4 will be formalized using SPA and 
fed to the checking tool - CoPS, results will be fed back to revise the security 
requirements 
Artifacts:  
(1) Formal checking results 
 
 Furthermore, the results also show that formal checking tools, such as CoPS, are 
useful and efficient to prove the correctness of the security properties based on the 
available security requirements. If the correctness of a security property is proven by the 
tools, further security policies can be introduced accordingly. However, even if the 
security property is not validated by a formal checking tool, the results and checking 
process can uncover some potential security breach points and further aid the design of 
the system to provide better security. 
 
6.3 FUTURE WORK 
 This thesis offers a concrete example of using the proposed process to model the 
Cyber-Physical System. More Cyber-Physical Systems need to be considered and various 
functional and non-functional requirements that coupling with the security requirements 
need to be identified and analyzed to further prove the wide application of this process. 
After modeling the information flow security of the Cyber-Physical Systems, possible 
solution as obfuscating the system need to be considered to secure the system. More work 
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